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TIME TO END PRESIDENTIAL CAUCUSES 
Sean J. Wright* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the middle of the hotly contested Iowa Democratic presidential 
caucuses, precinct results were so close that “more than a dozen delegates 
were awarded based on coin flips.”1  While rare, relying upon similar 
games of chance is a long-standing feature of the nomination process in 
Iowa.2  These coin tosses were initially reported as decisive, many of the 
reports were quickly amended to highlight the much more nuanced process 
of selecting delegates in the Iowa caucuses.3  In the topsy-turvy 2016 
presidential election cycle, the real story was not the one-off oddities of 
each caucus or primary; rather, it was that the process played out as 
intended. 
The way we select presidential nominees needs to change.  It is true that 
“[n]ominating candidates for president is one of the most important features 
of American governance.”4  Yet, the rules governing this crucial process are 
set by national party rules and various state laws, creating a complex web of 
deadlines and processes that engenders voter confusion, disenfranchises 
some, and is ripe for reform. 
 
*  Special Counsel to Commissioner Ann M. Ravel, Federal Election Commission.  This 
Article is part of a forum entitled Election Law and the Presidency held at Fordham 
University School of Law.  The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, 
written in his personal capacity, and are not intended to represent the Federal Election 
Commission or the United States.  I am incredibly grateful for the support of my wife, Dania 
Korkor.  This Article is for you. 
 
 1. Russell Berman, Was the Iowa Caucus Decided by Coin Flips?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/hillary-clinton-bernie-sanders-
coin-flips-iowa-caucus/459429/ [https://perma.cc/XUH7-S4HS]. 
 2. See id. (“Games of chance have been included in the Democratic caucus rules 
‘forever,’ said Norm Sterzenbach, a former executive director of the state party who oversaw 
the nominating contests in 2008 and 2012.  ‘It happens, but it’s not frequent,’ he said in an 
interview on Tuesday afternoon.  They usually occur when calculations for electing 
delegates to the county convention result in an extra delegate that can’t be assigned to one 
candidate by rounding.  The county delegates are distinct from the ‘state delegation 
equivalents,’ which is what the party uses to determine how many delegates each candidate 
secures for the national convention in Philadelphia.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Domenico Montanaro, Coin-Toss Fact-Check:  No, Coin Flips Did Not 
Win Iowa for Hillary Clinton, NPR (Feb. 2, 2016, 6:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2016/02/02/465268206/coin-toss-fact-check-no-coin-flips-did-not-win-iowa-for-hillary-
clinton [https://perma.cc/TY7S-SNZ3]. 
 4. Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. Springer, Preface to REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATION PROCESS, at vii (Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. Springer eds., 2009). 
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In reality, the presidential caucus has outgrown its usefulness.  While 
previously exalted for promoting party unity and typified by the compelling 
Iowa caucuses, selecting delegates for national conventions through this 
method no longer adds value to the democratic process.  This Article will 
make the case for permanently moving away from presidential caucus 
elections for three reasons:  (1) caucuses disenfranchise and 
underenfranchise voters, (2) caucuses further partisan polarization and 
gridlock, and (3) they are an election administration nightmare.  A 
transition away from caucuses and to presidential primaries, along with a 
few additional structural changes will make the process more inclusive, 
provide voters a greater choice in nominees, and achieve the noble goal of 
more fully promoting electoral integrity. 
As this Article discusses, the national parties have repeatedly tinkered 
with the nomination process over the past forty years.  Since the fallout 
from the 1968 Democratic National Convention—where rioters vented their 
anger over an exclusionary nomination process and which led to a series of 
reforms to the presidential nominating process—the national parties have 
strived to find the balance between including individual voters in the 
process without removing the role of the party establishment.  After each 
presidential election cycle, the parties attempt to address the fundamental 
issues presented by that cycle.  Following 1968, reforms were enacted to 
take away power from party leaders and backroom dealers.5  However, in 
the 1980s, the pendulum swung back to the promotion of party leaders, at 
least in the Democratic Party, through the superdelegate rule.6 
Following the 2016 election cycle, there will be a great opportunity to 
implement reform.  A major change should be to move away from 
presidential caucuses.  They persist with, in the words of John Oliver, 
“complex, opaque rules.”7  These complex rules, which include 
participating in person for over an hour, negatively impacts participation in 
the electoral process.  For example, in 2012, “participation rates in the 
Republican Party’s caucuses averaged 3 percent.”8  3 percent.  
Compellingly, PolitiFact has observed that “[c]aucuses and delegate math 
can be incredibly confusing, and the arcane party structures don’t reflect 
how most people assume presidential selection works.”9  Yet, we want 
voters to understand the process and to feel engaged.  For these reasons, and 
the others discussed in this Article, it is time to end states’ use of the 
presidential caucuses to select party nominees. 
 
 5. See Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. Springer, Choosing Presidential Candidates, in 
REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS, supra note 4, at 1, 6–7. 
 6. Id. at 6. 
 7. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:  Primaries and Caucuses (HBO television 
broadcast May 22, 2016) [hereinafter Last Week Tonight]. 
 8. BARBARA NORRANDER, THE IMPERFECT PRIMARY:  ODDITIES, BIASES, AND 
STRENGTHS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS 76 (2d ed. 2015). 
 9. Lauren Carroll & Riley Snyder, Fact-Checking Claims About the Nevada 
Convention Chaos, POLITIFACT (May 19, 2016, 10:45 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-
o-meter/article/2016/may/19/claims-bernie-sanders-supporters-fraud-and-miscond/ 
[https://perma.cc/VAB9-Q9T7]. 
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I.  THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS 
This part will provide a brief overview of the presidential nomination 
process by detailing the history of attempted reform.  This part also will 
include an in-depth review of the caucus process. 
A.  History of Reform 
The presidential selection process has undergone significant change over 
the past century.  Before 1972, the process for selecting delegates to the 
national party conventions lacked coherence.  Typically, “caucuses or party 
leaders (such as the governor or party bosses) chose delegates.”10  In the 
early twentieth century, the parties employed a very different approach, 
with an “election at state or district conventions and ‘delegate primaries’ in 
which delegates’ names, but usually not presidential candidates’ names, 
were on the ballot.”11  Also, at the same time, the public came to view the 
caucus system “as an instrument of party leader control; this perception 
stimulated a shift in many states from caucuses to primaries.”12 
The frustration over the presidential selection process boiled over 
following the 1968 Democratic National Convention.  When the 
Democratic Party nominated Vice President Hubert Humphrey for the 
presidency, it struck a nerve.13  The convention “occurred in the midst of 
intensifying anti-Vietnam War sentiment in the party, in the aftermath of 
the April assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and the June 
assassination of Senator Bobby Kennedy, and during clashes between 
protesters and Mayor Richard Daley’s Chicago police.”14  In one fell 
swoop, “[t]he disastrous 1968 Democratic National Convention shattered 
confidence in [the] efficient but undemocratic system.”15 
Hubert Humphrey won the nomination without setting foot on the 
campaign trail or participating in any primary, but rather he worked with 
party leaders to gain delegates through the more traditional state party 
committees and conventions.16  Predominately liberal members of the party, 
who had supported Eugene McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy, called for 
reform in the process.17 
To address these concerns, “the convention authorized the creation of the 
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, known as the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission.”18  The McGovern-Fraser Commission’s 
 
 10. Alan Martinson, Note, La Follette’s Folly:  A Critique of Party Associational Rights 
in Presidential Nomination Politics, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 185, 188 (2008). 
 11. Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 2. 
 12. Heather R. Abraham, Note, Legitimate Absenteeism:  The Unconstitutionality of the 
Caucus Attendance Requirement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2010). 
 13. See Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Sean Wilentz & Julian E. Zelizer, A Rotten Way to Pick a President, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 17, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/14/AR200 
8021401595.html [https://perma.cc/8EB6-R2WU]. 
 16. Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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reforms primarily had the effect of several states adopting candidate 
primaries, “doubling the number of primary voters between 1968 and 1972 
and eliminating the old processes that were often manipulated by state party 
leaders.”19  However, not all Democratic Party leaders were pleased to see 
presidential primaries implemented over caucuses.20 
During the 1970s, the Republican Party followed several of the reforms 
instituted after the McGovern-Fraser Commission, which sparked 
significant changes over the last forty years.21  Following the changes of the 
1970s, the new system was tested by the candidacies of Ronald Reagan and 
Jimmy Carter.  Unsurprisingly, having broken the absolute power of the 
party bosses, “[t]he GOP’s reforms gave a stronger voice to the Republican 
right, letting the upstart Reagan nearly upset President Gerald R. Ford in 
1976 by winning the North Carolina and Texas primaries.”22  Similarly, 
Jimmy Carter used a stunning victory in the “Iowa caucuses to transform 
himself from an unknown peanut farmer and obscure governor (‘Jimmy 
who?’) into the front-runner.”23  Incidentally, the next wave of reforms 
would address the fear of a weaker outside candidate unable to marshal 
significant support among the party faithful.24  In 1981, the Democratic 
Party convened the fourth nominating commission in twelve years and 
began developing new rules to reassert party leadership.25  The party 
created what is now known as the “superdelegate rule,” which included 
“governors, members of Congress and former presidents.”26 
Since then, following each presidential election cycle, the parties attempt 
to address the perceived flaws in the process.  Following 2008, the 
Democratic Party considered the role of superdelegates and the issue of 
front-loading.27  In 2012, the Republican Party changed certain delegate 
pledging rules to require delegates to be pledged on the first ballot—a move 
viewed by the party as one to accelerate the nomination selection process 
and limit the length of the campaign.28 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 6 (“The rapid shift to primaries, particularly in most of the big states, surprised 
Democratic reformers and even disappointed some.  [Representative Donald] Fraser, for 
example, advocated participatory caucuses that involved hours of discussion of the 
candidates and issues and gave the more highly motivated partisans more influence over 
outcomes.  Incidentally, Fraser’s home state of Minnesota was one of the states that 
continued to use a caucus-convention system.”). 
 21. Wilentz & Zelizer, supra note 15 (“The Republican Party, feeling some of the same 
frustration, soon followed suit.”). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 6. 
 25. David S. Broder, Democrats and Unintended Consequences, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 
1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/17/democrats-and-
unintended-consequences/d4741a07-05a2-47b1-bd33-b04458338005/ [https://perma.cc/MT 
76-5YT6]. 
 26. Wilentz & Zelizer, supra note 15. 
 27. See Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 8. 
 28. Patrick O’Connor, Could a 2012 Rule Change Upend the GOP’s 2016 Nomination 
Process?, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2015, 7:10 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/ 
07/10/could-a-2012-rule-change-upend-the-gops-2016-nomination-process/ (“Some have 
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B.  The Caucus 
During the 2016 election cycle, thirteen states and four territories 
administered presidential caucuses, each of them using various complex, 
opaque rules to administer the process.29  But how does the caucus process 
actually work?  Take, for example, the 2016 Iowa caucuses.  What is it like 
for a caucus goer on caucus night?  In Iowa, once the caucus is called to 
order, supporters for the various candidates voice their support.  Then, the 
caucus goers physically separate into groups of like-minded supporters in 
the corners of the room.30 
Domenico Montanaro of NPR described this process as “like a junior 
high dance, if the kids weren’t so petrified of each other.”31  An elected 
chair then assesses the number of supporters.32  During this initial round, 
each candidate needs the support of at least 15 percent of the participants.33  
The supporters of candidates deemed nonviable must then choose another 
candidate.34  This “re-caucus” obligates shuffling and can encourage the 
cajoling and persuading of these supporters to join other groups.35  “Once 
the re-caucusing is settled, . . . the numbers are tallied.”36 
In Iowa, “[t]here were 1,683 precinct caucuses” that “elected 11,065 
delegates to the county conventions, which [took] place March 12,” but 
“[t]hat universe of 11,065 delegates [will be] whittled down to 1,406 who 
will attend congressional district (April 30) and state conventions (June 
18),” and “[t]he breakdown of those 11,065 is not reported on caucus 
night.”37  All told, following the precinct caucuses, delegates attend county, 
congressional, and state conventions to pick the national convention 
delegates.  The entire process of selecting the delegates to the national 
convention takes months, with forty-four delegates eventually being sent to 
the national convention.38 
When the media reported Hillary Clinton’s 49.9 to 49.6 percent lead over 
Bernie Sanders, that meant only “state delegate equivalents.”39  That means 
those are estimated percentages of how many delegates per candidate, out 
of the 11,065 available, will attend the congressional district and state 
 
suggested this rule might help winnow the field, as a de facto shortcut to winning the 
nomination.”) [https://perma.cc/4WJ5-F7LJ]. 
 29. FEC, 2016 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY DATES AND CANDIDATE FILING DEADLINES FOR 
BALLOT ACCESS 5–6 (2016), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016pdates.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/B48R-L73U]; Last Week Tonight, supra note 7 (discussing the State of 
Washington’s use of an uncounted caucus). 
 30. Domenico Montanaro, How Exactly Do the Iowa Caucuses Work?, NPR (Jan. 30, 
2016, 8:08 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/30/464960979/how-do-the-iowa-caucuses-
work [https://perma.cc/EFH4-PT7J]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Montanaro, supra note 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 38. Montanaro, supra note 30. 
 39. Montanaro, supra note 3. 
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conventions.40  Yet, in the months and weeks to follow, that number could 
change drastically through the congressional and state conventions, 
contributing to the uncertainty that surrounds the caucus process. 
II.  THE CASE FOR ENDING PRESIDENTIAL CAUCUSES 
While the call to do away with presidential caucuses has grown louder 
over the years, there is still significant resistance to change.41  Specifically, 
“[d]espite their flaws, caucuses are treasured by many voters who have 
grown up with the tradition.”42  The most commonly identified benefits of 
caucuses, however, the so-called “salutary aspects,” including “collective 
deliberation of candidate options and issues”43 and promoting party unity, 
are no longer sufficient to justify their use in the nomination process.  
Caucuses are “a deeply flawed method for selecting a nominee.”44  As one 
observer noted, “[i]n theory, caucuses fostered community and civic 
deliberation . . . [i]n practice they prevented participation by those who had 
little time to spare.”45 
This part will make the case for turning away from presidential caucuses 
by noting three significant deficiencies in the caucus process.  First, 
caucuses disenfranchise and underenfranchise many voters.  Second, by 
drawing upon a more extreme electorate, caucuses further partisan gridlock.  
Third, the unique nature of the caucus process makes it impossible to 
administer any vote-counting or recount process to ensure the integrity of 
the caucus results. 
A.  Caucuses Disenfranchise Voters 
The parties need to move away from presidential caucuses because they 
underenfranchise minority voters in caucus states and disenfranchise voters 
in states with later nomination processes by taking away their right to a 
“meaningful” vote.  As the Washington Post has lamented, “[C]aucuses can 
be highly undemocratic.”46  To that end, the reforms initially ushered into 
the presidential nomination process in the 1970s have produced a more fair 
and democratic process.47  Gone are the backroom deals and party bosses.48  
 
 40. See id. 
 41. Josh Israel, America Is Supposed to Be a Democracy. So Why Do We Still Have 
Caucuses?, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 15, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/america-is-supposed-
to-be-a-democracy-so-why-do-we-still-have-caucuses-ffbbdf32caf9#.od36joxz3 
[https://perma.cc/QWK3-6E73]. 
 42. Abraham, supra note 12, at 1005. 
 43. Costas Panagopoulos, Are Caucuses Bad for Democracy?, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 425, 427 
(2010). 
 44. Id. 
 45. JAMES W. CEASAR ET AL., EPIC JOURNEY:  THE 2008 ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 97 (2009). 
 46. Wilentz & Zelizer, supra note 15. 
 47. Richard Pildes, Two Myths About the Unruly American Primary System, WASH. 
POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/25/ 
two-myths-about-the-unruly-american-primary-system/ (“The recommended reforms [from 
the McGovern-Fraser Commission] aimed to make the caucus system more open, more 
transparent and more accessible to all Democrats.”) [https://perma.cc/ED3H-8DMG]. But 
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Yet, “[t]he increased power that voters now exert over presidential 
nominees has not, however, been allocated equally among all voters.”49  
The first caucus and primary elections, Iowa and New Hampshire, have a 
disproportionately strong influence on selecting the ultimate presidential 
nominees.50  As such, many have long bemoaned the racially 
unrepresentative composition of voters in the Iowa caucuses.51  It is clear 
that “[t]he first states to cast votes are culturally distinct from the nation as 
a whole.”52 
The consequence of this early placement in the election season is agenda 
setting.53  Scholars have noted that “candidates pay minimal attention at the 
outset of their campaigns to issues that particularly affect black citizens.”54  
The same is true for the issues impacting all minority groups.  In fact, “[t]he 
racial homogeneity of the early-voting states, along with their lack of a 
major metropolitan area, establishes a domestic agenda that often overlooks 
issues that strongly affect” minority communities.55 
The caucus process also is at odds with many of our deeply held notions 
of free and fair elections.  By “eliminat[ing] the secret ballot,” voters are 
forced “to declare their loyalties publicly, and are thus vulnerable to 
intimidation and manipulation.”56  The caucuses “also shut out many 
citizens who have to work during caucus times.”57  If you do not attend in 
person, you cannot participate.  This particularly overburdens lower-class 
and middle-class voters, who often have fixed shifts or are unable to be 
away from home or work for extended periods of time.58 
Recent political science research has shown that the caucus system 
disproportionately disenfranchises minorities, low-income earners, and 
young people, who are much less likely to show up than older, white, 
wealthier voters.  For example, in an issue brief, Tova Wang of the Century 
Foundation argued that “voters, especially new voters, will have difficulty 
 
see id. (“But the commission was not trying to create a purely populist, primary-controlled 
system that essentially eliminated the voice of the institutional party figures.”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Note, Underenfranchisement:  Black Voters and the Presidential Nominating 
Process, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2318, 2318 (2004). 
 50. Lisa K. Parshall & Franco Mattei, Challenging the Presidential Nomination Process:  
The Constitutionality of Front-Loading, 26 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2004) 
(“Perhaps the most egregious deficiency of a front-loaded calendar is that by the time many 
voters cast their preferences, nominations have already been mathematically determined.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Gerald C. Wright, Rules and Ideological Character of Primary Electorates, 
in REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS, supra note 4, at 23, 27; Anthony 
Johnstone, The Federalist Safeguards of Politics, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 444 
n.140 (2016);. 
 52. Johnstone, supra note 51, at 444 n.140. 
 53. Note, supra note 49, at 2322–23. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2322. 
 56. Wilentz & Zelizer, supra note 15. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Ian Millhiser, Ban the Iowa Caucus, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://thinkprogress.org/ban-the-iowa-caucus-1be63c1c6bdb#.4m9vuj3oo [https://perma.cc/ 
KN5H-TLGL]. 
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navigating caucuses’ arcane rules and procedures and that participation will 
be discouraged by the strenuous and time-consuming demands (one time, 
location) caucuses place on voters.”59 
The physical attendance requirement of the caucus process alone “tends 
to disenfranchise identifiable factions of voters, such as deployed service 
members, religious observers, persons with disabilities or in poor health, 
students who attend school away from home, and shift workers unable to 
leave work.”60  In turn, this produces a caucus pool of voters who represent 
a narrow range of backgrounds, interests, and experiences.61 
This means that campaigns are incentivized to prioritize only the most 
avid partisans and consistent voters—the few that turn out to vote.62  
Turnout is historically lower in caucus states, particularly compared to 
primary election states.  “The 2.5 percent turnout rate in the 1976 Iowa 
caucuses paled alongside the 33.4 percent who voted in that year’s New 
Hampshire primary,” and “[a]cross all states in 1976, turnout averaged 1.9 
percent for the caucuses and 28.2 percent for the primaries.”63  As of 2016, 
not much has changed.  Campaigns looking to pick up votes in the 
admittedly small state of Iowa have a smaller window of committed, 
partisan supporters to woo. 
In addition, other scholars have argued that the phenomenon of “front-
loading,” which is when states move their caucuses and primaries earlier in 
the calendar, exacerbates the underrepresentativeness of the caucus 
system.64  In the early 1970s, Iowa moved up its caucus schedule.65  Gerald 
C. Wright has noted that, as a result, Iowa has assumed “importance far out 
of proportion to [its] contributions to the delegate counts.”66  In fact, since 
 
 59. Panagopoulos, supra note 43, at 427. 
 60. Abraham, supra note 12, at 1004 (detailing the experience of Felipe Goodman, who, 
after serving a decade as a rabbi in Nevada, became a citizen intending to vote but was 
unable to because the state’s scheduled caucus was held on a Saturday and required 
attendance); see also Richard L. Hasen, Whatever Happened to “One Person, One Vote”?, 
SLATE (Feb. 5, 2008, 5:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2183751/ (“Orthodox Jews 
complained that they couldn’t vote in the Saturday morning Nevada caucuses.”) 
[https://perma.cc/Z4VA-CQ8E]. 
 61. The impact of these rules also implicates basic rights of participation and evokes the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s voter-participation cases.  Cf. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption 
Temptation, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 36 (2014).  In those cases, the Court has been concerned 
where state law excludes a class of citizens from participation in the democratic process.  
Examples include, Harper v. Va. State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where the 
Court struck down Virginia’s poll tax on the ground that wealth was not relevant to a 
citizen’s ability to participate in the political process, and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960), which held unconstitutional Tuskegee’s racial gerrymandering ordinance that 
removed almost all of the black citizens from the city. 
 62. See infra Part II.B. 
 63. Thomas E. Patterson, Voter Participation:  Records Galore This Time, but What 
About Next Time?, in REFORMING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS, supra note 4, at 
44, 46. 
 64. See Parshall & Mattei, supra note 50, at 1. 
 65. Anthony J. Gaughan, Five Things You Should Know About the Iowa Caucuses, 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/five-things-know-iowa-
caucuses-418948 [https://perma.cc/ZH9B-PMAB]. 
 66. Wright, supra note 51, at 27. 
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the 1980s, it has been “obvious that early events received far more 
candidate and media attention and caused many candidates to drop out once 
their popularity and fundraising ability proved inadequate to continue.”67 
The earlier states’ power, particularly Iowa’s, lies in the winnowing of 
the field of candidates and the perception of momentum.68  This is 
important for the campaigns because, “[i]f the participants in the early states 
are indeed somehow unrepresentative of the larger set of decision-makers 
whose preferences should weigh in on the final nomination choice, then 
their participation constitutes a bias favoring some kinds of candidates over 
others.”69  The unrepresentative early state caucus goers might “screen out 
candidates who might gain momentum and competitiveness with a different 
set of early states.”70 
Finally, “[t]he caucus system also presents an example where people can 
be routinely denied the opportunity to cast a meaningful vote.”71  During 
the caucus process, as discussed earlier, “a voter whose candidate does not 
receive a fixed percentage of the vote in the first round of voting—usually 
fifteen percent—will not be able to ‘vote’ for that candidate in later 
rounds”72 and instead will be forced to revote for a different candidate.  
This means, in the caucus system, voters lack a “meaningful” right to 
vote.73  While they may have the ability to join the caucus and participate in 
the discussion regarding the potential nominees, “at a certain point they 
may no longer be able to cast a vote for their candidate of choice.”74  This is 
not a denial of a formal right to vote; but, in seeking the ideal presidential 
nomination process, encouraging meaningful voting is a desirable 
characteristic. 
Moreover, voters in later caucuses and primaries also are denied a 
meaningful right to vote because their preferred candidate, or at least a 
larger, diverse pool of candidates, dissipates after the earlier states have 
completed their nomination process.75  In the past two decades, other states 
have attempted to jump the line and hold their caucus or primary earlier.  
This makes sense.  During the 2000 presidential election cycle, “both 
 
 67. Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 7. 
 68. Wright, supra note 51, at 27. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Chad Flanders, What Do We Want in a Presidential Primary:  An Election Law 
Perspective, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 921 (2011). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (“A right to a meaningful vote, by comparison, implicates the diversity of the 
field of candidates running, and whether there is a candidate running who matches up with 
your preferences, or more generally, who you think is running on an attractive platform. 
Even if your favored candidate may never win the election, having a meaningful vote means 
that you get at least the chance to vote for him or her. This is another way of saying that a 
right to a meaningful vote may not be a right to an effective vote. A meaningful vote is one 
cast in favor of a candidate you like whether or not your vote is effective in getting that 
candidate elected.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Benjy Sarlin, Republican Field Narrows as Iowa Caucus Knocks Out 
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parties had contested nominations decided earlier than ever, with about 40% 
of their primaries to follow at a later date and thus entirely irrelevant,” and 
“[i]n 2004, the Democratic Party identified its nominee before voters in 16 
primary states . . . had their say.”76 
The caucus process excludes too many from the nomination process 
because, by their very design, they are exclusive.  Caucuses exclude 
minority communities and are inaccessible for the disabled, the working 
voter, and the caregiver.77  In particular, the Iowa caucus tends to rely on a 
small, homogenous subset of caucus goers who are not reflective of the 
diversity of the American electorate.  It is time to consider alternatives to 
the caucuses.78 
B.  Caucuses Exacerbate Polarization 
A wealth of research also shows how presidential caucuses exacerbate 
party polarization.79  Polarization is a fixture in the political process, but it 
has reached historic levels.80  While strategies are needed to reduce 
polarization, the few that have been offered seek to cure polarization in 
Congress.81  Reforming the presidential nominating contest is not a panacea 
for polarization, but it could be a first step toward meaningful participation 
and reducing gridlock. 
First, studies have shown that caucuses tend to have significantly less 
participation than primaries.82  This means that only a small subset of the 
country is meaningfully participating in selecting the delegates to the 
national conventions, where the party’s nominees accept the nomination.  
As discussed above, this, combined with the front-loading phenomenon, 
results in only an incredibly small subset of voters in a handful of states 
playing a role in winnowing the field of potential candidates.  This has a 
direct impact on the types of candidates who make it through the caucus 
process.  Scholars have argued that “low turnout produces biases between 
the general population and the voting public, a concern that is conceivably 
exacerbated by caucuses, which attract fewer participants to the events.”83 
There are also measurable differences between the presidential primaries 
and caucuses.  In a 2010 study, Professor Costas Panagopoulos found that 
“across the six demographic characteristics[,] . . . the distributions of traits 
among both caucus participants and primary voters are substantively similar 
to those in the population as a whole, although there are indications that 
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caucus participants are more dissimilar from the population, compared to 
primary voters.”84  According to Professor Panagopoulous: 
Generally speaking, there is clear evidence that caucus voters held more 
extreme views on these issues, compared to both primary voters and to the 
population at large . . . [and] these estimates suggest that the public’s 
policy preferences overall were more congruent with those of primary 
voters than with those of caucus voters.85 
This is significant because it means that caucus goers influence the 
delegates selected for the county and state-level caucuses—and ultimately 
the delegates attending the national conventions—are more polarized than 
the rest of the public. 
Particularly in terms of policy preferences, the difference between caucus 
goers and the general public “can produce bias with respect to candidate 
choice, manifesting themselves through differential levels of support for 
each of the parties’ contenders.”86  This can be seen in the caucus results of 
the Iowa Republican presidential caucus, where recently more socially 
conservative candidates have been successful.87 
Gerald Wright has astutely observed that “[a]s the parties have become 
more polarized . . . the voices of the two parties come from increasingly 
distant ideological positions, with the likely result that the candidates 
nominated will be polarized as well.”88  That is troubling because 39 
percent of Americans consider themselves independent and are turned off 
by increased partisanship.89  This means that “the great middle of the 
electorate is left unrepresented.”90  Regardless of the purported benefits of 
party unity, a process that furthers polarization and gridlock—while 
simultaneously discouraging the nearly 40 percent of Americans who 
consider themselves to be independent from participating—is worthy of 
reconsideration. 
C.  Caucuses Present Administrative Challenges 
Finally, by design, the caucus system, with its multiple-round series of 
tallies, cajoling and persuading voters, and retallying of votes, makes 
meaningfully resolving caucus electoral disputes impossible.  
Fundamentally, it may not be feasible to accurately determine the results of 
the caucus.  Consider this year’s Iowa Democratic presidential caucus.  
Following a contentious night of caucusing, the Des Moines Register 
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editorial board called for an audit of the results, calling the caucus a 
“debacle.”91 
“The Iowa Democratic Caucuses are not a primary,” but rather, according 
to Iowa Democratic Party Press Secretary Sam Lau, “[T]hey are the first 
step in a representative delegate selection process.”92  This works by 
awarding county delegates “based on Democrats who came to the caucuses 
on Monday who aligned and then realigned—sometimes for a different 
candidate than they initially supported.”93  According to Lau, because 
“[t]here are no paper ballots to recount” and because “Monday’s caucuses 
were a unique event that involved more than 171,000 Iowans and their 
neighbors at a specific time and place,” the result “cannot be re-created or 
recounted.”94 
This is an important distinction between caucuses and primary elections.  
The caucuses are a ticking time bomb of ballot-casting and ballot-counting 
controversy.  Professor Edward Foley has talked extensively about the 
importance of avoiding vote-counting disputes.95  It is true that no electoral 
system is impervious to dispute, no matter how well designed or 
administered.  The parties, however, could reduce the risk of controversy by 
moving away from caucuses, which, given their unique, one-off nature, 
leave room for dispute and, in the words of Sam Lau, “cannot be re-created 
or recounted.”96 
Now, this is not to say that an audit of the reported caucus results is 
impossible or even impracticable.  The lack of safeguards in the process, 
however, means that the public lacks an ability to ensure errors did not 
occur during the caucusing itself.  The Des Moines Register’s editorial keys 
in on this distinction.97  During the 2016 Iowa Democratic presidential 
caucus, “[t]oo many accounts have arisen of inconsistent counts, untrained 
and overwhelmed volunteers, confused voters, cramped precinct locations, 
a lack of voter registration forms and other problems.”98  According to 
members of the editorial board who were observing caucuses, there were 
plenty of “opportunities for error amid Monday night’s chaos.”99  It would 
be exceedingly difficult to accurately resolve a challenge alleging errors in 
those processes. 
In our presidential nomination process, we should keep in mind what 
Charles Evans Hughes once proclaimed: “Our entire system of government 
 
 91. Gabriel Debenedetti, Sanders Prepares for Possible Challenge to Iowa Caucus 
Results, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2016, 9:07 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/bernie-
sanders-iowa-caucuses-challenge-218784#ixzz44g8lQpuF [https://perma.cc/AY3U-S5TR]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See generally EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES 348 (2016). 
 96. Debenedetti, supra note 91. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Something Smells in the Democratic Party, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/caucus/2016/02/03/editorial-
something-smells-democratic-party/79777580/ [https://perma.cc/8ALB-QUE5]. 
 99. Id. 
2016] TIME TO END PRESIDENTIAL CAUCUSES 1139 
depends upon honest elections and a fair count.”100  Ensuring a fair count is 
a standard to strive for in our elections.101  This year came the closest to a 
full-scale dispute over the Iowa caucuses.  While Senator Bernie Sanders 
did not pursue a recount, as he contemplated,102 given the significant, 
disproportionate value placed on the Iowa caucus, other candidates may not 
have conceded as quickly.  Further, a different candidate in a different 
caucus state or in a different year may see the political advantage of 
challenging the results of the caucuses.  And in all elections, particularly 
presidential elections, “[b]allot counting is something for which 
appearances truly matter.”103  For these reasons, we should move away 
from presidential caucuses. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES 
If we are to move away from presidential caucuses, what should take 
their place?  Reformers have long sought that answer, and several options 
have emerged.  If the national parties choose to move away from a caucus 
to a primary election method in the thirteen states and four territories still 
holding caucuses, what type of system should they choose?  This part will 
discuss the two predominant ideas for improving the presidential primary 
system and a structural change that would improve both. 
A.  National Primary 
One popular reform idea is to have all states hold their primaries on the 
same day, also known as the “National Primary.”104  Holding the primaries 
on one day would eliminate the caucus system and negate the incentive to 
front-load the schedule of elections.  It would have a democratizing effect 
because “every voter could in principle be the ‘deciding’ vote of the 
primary election.”105 
One of the main criticisms of the national primary plan is that it would 
make it harder for lesser-known candidates to be successful.106 
B.  Regional Primary 
The other major reform proposal is a system of regional primaries.  There 
are several iterations on how this process might work, but generally, 
“[s]tates will be grouped along regional lines, reflecting both geography and 
interests,” with the “regional primaries . . . spread apart by a couple of 
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weeks, and held throughout the primary season.”107  Some reformers 
believe the smaller states should go first, much like the current regime of 
Iowa and New Hampshire holding the “first-in-the-nation” status.108  Others 
believe the first region should be assigned randomly or on a rotating 
basis.109 
The regional primary retains several of the structural flaws of the current 
system.  The earlier states remain in prime position to influence the agenda 
and tone of the campaign, as well as winnow the field. 
C.  Ranked Choice Voting 
A structural change that would address the three deficiencies in the 
caucuses—disenfranchising, further polarization, and the impossibility of 
resolving a vote-counting dispute—would be addressed by a process known 
as ranked choice voting (RCV), also known as instant runoff voting.110  
This process is currently used by voters in Minneapolis, Cambridge, 
Oakland, and internationally in countries such as Australia and Ireland.111 
RCV allows voters to indicate their ideal choice and then rank the 
remaining candidates.112  After the first round of counting, the candidate 
with the fewest votes is eliminated and his or her voters shift their support 
to their already identified second choice.113  This instant runoff continues 
“until the winner secures a majority of the vote.”114  In the context of a 
presidential primary, RCV would ensure that everyone could cast a 
meaningful vote for their preferred candidate.115  But, unlike the caucus 
system where voters are cajoled into supporting a candidate in the room 
with their friends and neighbors, each voter can rank candidates as they 
wish without intimidation or harassment.116  RCV also encourages more 
positive campaigns by encouraging candidates to find the broadest support 
possible—because they are looking for voters’ second and third votes.  
Minneapolis Mayor Betsy Hodges credits RCV for her surprise victory in 
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2013.117  Moreover, RCV has been shown to reduce polarization and, given 
that runoffs are instantaneous, the administrative issues impacting caucuses 
are eliminated.118 
This is a novel suggestion, but the United States has historically used 
alternative approaches to winner-take-all elections.119  And, other leading 
scholars have advocated for its inclusion in the presidential primary 
process.120  In striving for the ideal presidential nomination process, using 
tools—like RCV—that foster civility, inclusivity, and expand voter choice 
is a step in the right direction. 
CONCLUSION 
Every four years, the country waits in anticipation for the results of the 
Iowa caucuses.  Yet, as Larry Sabato has remarked, “Even a cursory glance 
at the presidential primary process reveals fundamental flaws that 
undermine democratic process, disenfranchise some voters and cede too 
much power to others, increase the cost of elections, and extend the 
duration of campaigns.”121  It is finally time to reform our presidential 
nomination process.  An important first step is to move away from 
presidential caucuses.  This is because, as political science research has 
shown, “replacing caucuses with primaries may result in some marginal 
improvements in terms of demographic and attitudinal representation.”122 
These marginal improvements, however, will have a large impact on the 
types of candidates that are successfully able to navigate the nomination 
process; they will not be decided by a fraction of the population in two 
homogeneous states.  Indeed, marginal improvements will ensure that more 
Americans can take a meaningful part in our presidential process.  This 
much we know to be true, “[f]or true democrats who put a premium on the 
voice of the average citizen,” moving away from caucuses “is itself enough 
reason to move towards a blanket adoption of primaries.”123  It is worth 
doing. 
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